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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JAMES E. BALLENBERGER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17619 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict of guilty 
of the offense of Theft, in violation of § 76-6-404 and 
§ 76-6-412, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. The 
charge was based on appellant's exercise of unauthorized 
control over the property of another with intent to deprive 
him of his property. The property stolen was of a value 
exceeding $1,000 and thus a second-degree felony sentence was 
imposed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the outset of the trial, the court held an 
evident iary hearing on the appellant's Motion to Suppress 
~idence (T. 81). Appellant claimed that the evidence should 
have been excluded since his initial detention by the officer 
constituted an unlawful arrest; thus, evidence subsequently 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
obtained was inadmissible. The trial court denied the motion 
(T. 86), holding that appellant was not unlawfully arrested 
and that subsequent evidence was not unconstitutionally 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
The case was tried on the 28th and 29th of January, 
1981, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding. The 
appellant was convicted by a jury of theft, a second-degree 
felony, in that the value of the property exceeded $1,000. 
The trial court also denied appellant's motion to 
dismiss, stating that the issues raised were questions of 
credibility which were properly left to the jury as triers of 
fact (T. 157). 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison on 
March 5, 1981 to serve an indeterminate term of from one to 15 , 
years as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of: 1) the jury 
verdict of guilt rendered in the trial court; 2) the trial 
court's denial of appellant's Motion to Suppress; and 3) the 
trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss for lack 
of sufficient evidence. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 15, 1980, Officer Ray Levitre was engaged in 
routine patrol when he noticed a vehicle heading eastbound on 
the Highland Dairy access road (T. 26, 123). Due to the large 
~mber of burglaries which had recently occurred in the area, 
the officer had been requested to increase his patrol and 
identify anyone stopped in the area (T. 40, 43). 
As the car came within viewing distance of Officer 
~Vitre's car it made a sudden turn into the parking lot of 
the Oakwood business district and went behind a row of 
buildings located there (T. 28, 29, 124). Officer Levitre 
backed up about 100 yards and waited to see if the car was 
going to re-emerge from behind the buildings (T. 30, 125, 
126). When the car failed to re-emerge, Officer Levitre 
called for assistance and went to investigate (T. 31, 127). 
He arrived where the vehicle was located and noted 
that the area was well lit (T. 32), and that the appellant was 
standing in front of the vehicle with the hood up and the 
engine off (T. 32, 33, 127). The officer then pulled his car 
alongside the passenger side of the other vehicle and asked if 
t~re was a problem (T. 33, 43, 52, 128), to which the 
appellant replied that they were checking the oil. The 
officer then left his vehicle and approached the other car 
a~ing the appellant and his companion for identification (T. 
34, 130). The appellant had none (T. 145). 
-3-
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As Officer Levitre approached the other vehicle he 
noticed in the back seat, in plain view, stereo equipment and 
other property (T. 35, 128). He asked appellant who the 
property belonged to just as Officer Hansen was arriving (T. 
36, 131). He then asked Officer Hansen to take the appellant 
to his vehicle and question him about the. property and th; 
circumstances of their presence in the area at 3: 30 in the 
morning (T. 37, 131). 
Officer Hansen then placed the appellant in his 
patrol c;ar, gave him Miranda warnings, and questioned him (T. 
38). The appellant told Officer Hansen that he had bought the 
property from a third-party friend of Lynn Fulton (11ho was the 
other person in the car) whom he could not identify (T. 45, 
141). Officer Hansen told this to Officer Levitre, who had 
received a different story from Lynn Fulton (T. 41, 71). 
Officer Levitre then confronted Fulton with the inconsistency 
of his and appellant's stories. Fulton told Officer Levitre 
he had lied and the property had really come from a van which 
was located nearby (T. 45). Officer Levitre and Lynn Fulton 
then went to the place where the van was located, found the 
owner, and returned to the scene where the property was 
identified as belonging to Robby Ashby (T. 46, 132). 
The appellant and Lynn Fulton were then placed 
under arrest (T. 46). The car was towed to the Murray police 
station and then seized (T. 39). 
-4-
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At trial appellant made a motion to suppress the 
evidence claiming that it was obtained pursuant to an illegal 
arrest (T. 81). The trial court determined that the arrest 
did not occur until probable cause existed and therefore 
denied the motion to suppress (T. 86). At the end of the 
state's case the appellant made a motion to dismiss (T. 145), 
c~iming that value had not been established and that failure 
~produce the tools constituted a denial of due process (T. 
146). The trial court denied this motion stating that the 
issues presented were questions of credibility which should 
properly be decided by the jury (T. 157). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL INQUIRY OF APPELLANT WAS 
PERMISSIBLE AND THE SUBSEQUENT ARREST WAS 
NOT ILLEGAL. 
Appellant contends that the initial questioning of 
appellant and Lynn Fulton was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in that the 
officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that they were 
engaged in criminal conduct. He also contends that the 
subsequent arrest was unconstitutional since it was not based 
on probable cause. Both of these contentions are without 
merit when viewed in light of all the circumstances. Officer 
-5-
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LeVirtre was justified in making the initial inquiry and 
questioning of the appellant and his arrest was only made 
after probable cause had been established. 
A. NOT ALL DETENTIONS CONSTITUTE AN 
UNLAWFUL ARREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL. 
The case of Terry v. Ohio, 392. U.S. 1 (1968), upon 
which appellant relies, established that a police officer may 
detain and question a person based on information which falls 
short of establishing probable cause to arrest the person. 
The facts of Terry are similar in many respects to the case at 
bar. There, an experienced Cleveland police officer, while 
patrolling on foot, had his attention attracted to two persons 
who repeatedly walked up and down a street pausing to look 
into a particular store window each time they passed. The 
officer suspected that they might be "casing" the store in 
contemplation of a possible robbery and thus approached the 
individuals to question them. When they gave evasive answers 
the officer also frisked them for weapons. 
In upholding both the stop and the frisk, the 
United States Supreme Court wrote: 
• • • there is no ready test for deter-
mining reasonableness other than by 
balancing the need to search or seize 
against the invasion which the search or 
seizure entails .••• And in justifying 
-6-
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the particular intrusion, the police 
officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion. 
392 u.s. 1, 21. The Court reserved the issue, of when a 
seizure would be justified for purposes of detention and/or 
interrogation, Terry, supra, n. 16. In that footnote the 
Court observed: 
Obviously not all personal 
intercourse between policemen and 
citizens involves "seizures" of persons. 
Only when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has 
in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" 
has occurred. 
392 U.S. at 1, 19, n. 16. 
In the present case, Officer LeVitre's initial 
questioning of the appellant and his companion while they were 
"checking their oil" did not constitute a sufficient show of 
authority nor a restraining of their liberty to constitute a 
"seizure.• Thus, the protections of the Fourth Amendment do 
not apply to this initial encounter. 
This Court, in State v. Whittenback, Utah, 621 P.2d 
103, 105, adopted the standard of "objective credible reason" 
which was used in People v. La Pene, 40 N.Y. 2d 210, 352 N.E. 
2d 562 (1976) and its companion case, People v. DeBour, 352 
-7-
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N.E. 2d 562 (1976). In People v. DeBour, supra, the Court of 
Appeals of New York recognized that in some circumstances I. 
police officers may approach persons to conduct a preliminary I 
inquiry on facts falling short of the "reasonable suspic~n· 
standard of Terry, supra. In DeBour, two police officers, 
while walking down a street shortly after. midnight, noticed an 
individual walking toward them on the same side of the street, 
When the person got within thirty feet of the officers he 
quickly crossed the street. The officers also crossed and 
asked the defendant what he was doing in the area and asked 
for identification. Observing a bulge under the defendant's 
jacket, the officers asked him to unzip his jacket, which he 
did, revealing a loaded revolver in his waistband which the 
officers seized. 
In holding that this conduct did not constitute a 
"seizure," the Court wrote: 
This case raises the fundamental 
issue of whether or not a police officer, 
in the absence of any concrete indication 
of criminality, may approach a private 
citizen on the street for the purpose of 
requesting information. We hold that he 
may. The basis for this inquiry need not 
rest on any indication of criminal 
activity on the part of the person of 
whom inquiry is made but there must be 
some articulable reason sufficient to 
justify the police action which was 
taken. 
352 N.E.2d 562, 565. 
-8-
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rn the companion case, People v. La Pene, supra, the court 
i~icated how this analysis fits with the "reasonable 
suspicion" standard: 
We bear in mind that any 
inquiry into the propriety of police 
conduct must weigh the interference it 
entails against the precipitating and 
attending conditions. By this approach 
various intensities of police action are 
justifiable as the precipitating and 
attendant factors increase in weight and 
competence. The minimal intrusion of 
approaching to request information is 
permissible when there is some objective 
credible reason for that interference not 
necessarily indicative of criminality 
(People v. DeBour, jupra). The next 
degree, the common- aw right to inquire, 
is activated by a founded suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot and permits a 
somewhat greater intrusion in that a 
policeman is entitled to inferfere with a 
citizen to the extent necessary to gain 
explanatory information, but short of a 
forcible seizure. Where a police officer 
entertains a reasonable suspicion that a 
particular person has committed, is 
committing or is about to commit a felony 
or misdemeanor, this authorizes a 
forcible stop and detention of that 
person. 
352 N.E.2d 562, 571-572. Thus, all that is required for an 
initial confrontation between police and citizens in public 
places is an articulable, objective reason for the inquiry. 
In the present case, Officer Levitre, aware of the 
recent incidents of crime in the area, and the sudden swerve 
of the automobile when the drivers saw the patrol car (T. 31, 
40), was justified in initially approaching the appellant 
-9-
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and his companion. His suspicion of the defendants was fueled 
by the failure to re-emerge from behind buildings which were 
closed to the public and had recently been the target of 
several burglaries. He asked for identification pursua~ ~a 
police order to identify persons in the area ( T. 43). The 
appellant failed to produce identificatio~ (T. 35, 146). At 
this point the officer had seen the property located in plain 
view on the back seat of the automobile (T. 19, 20) and asked 
the parties to whom it belonged. In the circumstances, this 
question was reasonable and did not constitute a violation of 
the appellant's rights. 
In State v. Larson, Wash. App., 587 P.2d 171 
{ 1978), the court applied the DeBour rationale to a factual 
situation similar to the instant case. In Larson, officers 
saw several people in a car parked in a no-parking zone in a 
closed park late at night in an area in which many burglaries 
had recently occurred. The officers approached the car and 
asked each occupant for identification. As the defendant 
opened her purse to obtain identification, the officers saw 
and seized a bag of marijuana from the purse. In upholdi~ 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
this evidence, the court stated: 
While the presence of individuals 
wandering abroad late at night or at an 
unusual hour should not of itself 
precipitate a police investigation, it is 
a circumstance justifying suspicion. 
-10-
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••• Taking it in combination with 
factors such as the defendant's being 
seated in a car parked in a no-parking 
zone near a closed park in an area where 
numerous burglaries had occurred 
previously, police suspicion of illegal 
conduct was justifiable. Under such 
circumstances, the police may ask for 
identification • 
587 P.2d 171, 172-173. See also State v. Warner, Ore., 585 
P.2d 681 (1978) at 689. 
Here, the initial reasonable suspicion, as in 
Larson, was followed by a plain view sighting of contraband, 
which does not amount to a search in the constitutional sense. 
State v. Echevarrieta, Utah, 621 P.2d 709, 711 (1980). 
Although the stereo equipment and tools located in the back 
seat of the appellant's car were not immediately identified as 
s~len, they were properly seen through the window and not 
discovered during the course of an unlawful search. In light 
of the high rate of crime recently reported in the area, it 
was proper for the officer to ask the appellant and his 
companion where the items had come from. There is no 
indication in the record that either party refused to talk 
with the officers (Officer Hansen had arrived at the scene and 
asked appellant, who was outside the vehicle, to answer 
questions). There is also no indication that any force or 
threat of authority was used to force appellant to enter 
Officer Hansen's car for questioning. 
-11-
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B. THE "ARREST" OF THE APPELLANT WAS 
BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Appellant contends that from the point at which he 
I 
contrary to the testimony of 
he was under arrest. This is \ 
Officer Hansen (T. 140, 141, 1461 
entered Officer Hansen's car 
and could only be true if the appellant had indicated a de_sire 
to leave and had been unable to do so. Appellant cites the 
fact that he was given his Miranda warnings to support his 
contention. This fact, however, is not determinative of the 
po int in time at which an arrest is made. Miranda warnings 
are routinely given before any questioning is done to insure 
that information obtained is not subsequently suppressed for 
failure to give the warnings. 
The conduct of Officer Hansen in questioning the 
appellant was not an arrest since there was no indication that 
the appellant was not free to leave or that he was in custody. 
The conduct here merely constituted n thresh hold questioning' 
of the appellant. People v. Gurule, Colo., 471 P.2d 413, 416 
(1970). 
In State v. Marks, Kan., 602 P.2d 1344 (1979), the 
Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that where an officer don 
not stop a moving vehicle, but merely approaches the defendant 
sitting in a parked vehicle, there is no detention and hen~ 
no seizure. In the present case there was also no "stoppi~' 
-12-
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of the appellant and his companion since they were stationary 
at the time when the Officer approached. At the time that 
officer Hansen arrived, it was reasonable that he take the 
appellant avay from his companion and Office Levitre in order 
to test the consistency of the information obtained by each 
party. 
If this Court finds that the conduct of the 
officers constituted a "detention" or a "seizure" of the 
~pellant, it was justified under the "reasonable suspicion• 
standard of Terry, supra. Since Terry, most courts have 
recognized that: 
the governmental interest in 
effective crime prevention underlies the 
recognition that a police officer may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner approach a person for 
investigating possible criminal behavior, 
even though there is no probable cause to 
make an arrest. 
People v. Mangum, Colo., 539 P.2d 120, 123 (1975) (emphasis 
added). See also State v. Post, Idaho, 573 P.2d 153 (1978) 1 
State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125 (1977)1 United States v. 
~. 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the Terry standard 
of "reasonable suspicion" applies to detentions to investigate 
possible criminal activity. 
Furthermore, the cases cited by the appellant to 
support his claim that his arrest was not based on probable 
cause and therefore amounted to an unconstitutional seizure 
-13-
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under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution! 
do not apply to the circumstances of this case. In Peoplev. 
Miller, 496 P.2d 1228 (Cal. 1972), the California court wu 
correct to determine that the mere presence of an individual 
sleeping in his vehicle in a private parking lot did not gin 
rise to any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 
However, in the present case the observations of Officer 
Levitre which led him to make initial inquiries of the 
defendant, coupled with the report of thefts in the vicinity, 
were the bases of a reasonable suspicion of some criminal 
activity. This suspicion was further developed as he 
questioned the appellant and his companion about the items 
which were located in the back seat (T. 34, 130). Lawful 
questioning led to the information that the i terns were stolen 
and at that time probable cause to arrest the appellant was 
estasblished. Thus, unlike the Miller case, the arrest was 
not made without probable cause. 
People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979), is also 
distinguishable from the present case. There it was 
sufficient to establish probable cause that the appellant was 
seen in a community with a high crime rate. A general hi~ 
crime comrnuni ty is not analogous to an area in which several 
l The Fourth Amendment is virtually identical to Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
-14-
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recent thefts have preceeded the issuance of directives to 
increase police patrol and identify persons seen in the area 
(T. 40, 43). In State v. Folkes, Utah, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 
(1977), this Court recognized that: 
When a police officer sees or hears 
conduct which gives rise to suspicion of 
crime, he has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and 
investigations to determine whether the 
law is being violated; and if so, to take 
such measures as are necessary in the 
enforcement of the law. 
Applying this standard, Officer Levitre had a duty to pursue 
his initial observation of the appellant and Mr. Fulton to 
insure that activity of a criminal nature was not occurring. 
The fact that subsequent questioning provided information of a 
recent theft indicates the legitimacy of the suspicion which 
gave rise to a preliminary investigation. 
In State v. Folkes, supra, this Court also 
reiterated the test applied in Utah as to the propriety of 
searches and seizures: 
It is to be borne in mind that it is not 
all searches and seizures without a 
warrant which are proscribed by the 
constitutional provisions referred to. 
It is only of a search which is 
•unreasonable.• It is commonly and 
properly stated that the question as to 
whether a search is unreasonable depends 
upon the particular circumstances; and 
the question to be answered is whether 
reasonable and fair-minded persons would 
judge the alleged search and seizure to 
be unreasonable or oppressive. 
-15-
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565 P.2d 1125, 1127. When viewed in light of this test, 
Officer Le Vi tre 's conduct in approaching and questioning the 
appellant and his companion was not only "reasonable," but was 
based on cumulative articulable facts giving him reason~~ 
suspicion to believe that they were attempting to cover a 
crime which had recently been committed. The total 
circumstances, the sudden turn of the car upon seeing the 
patrol car (T. 29, 124), the lateness of the hour (T. 8), the 
knowledge of recent reports of crime in the area with requests 
to identify persons in the area ( T. 4 0, 4 3), and the failure 
of the car to re-emerge from behind businesses which were 
closed (T. 31, 127) distinguish this case from In re Tony c,, 
582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978) where no reasonable suspicion existed 
to justify stopping the defendant. 
The officer had a duty to make initial 
investigations, and during questioning of the appellant and 
his companion he discovered that the items located in the back 
seat of the automobile were stolen. At that point, there was 
probable cause to arrest the appellant; thus his rights were 
not violated by detaining him while Officer LeVi tre and his 
companion went to the location where the i terns had been stolen 
and returned with the owner, who identified the property as 
his. 
-16-
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Respondent agrees with appellant that the basic 
standard for arrest without a warrant was set forth by the 
united States Supreme Court in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 
(1964). This Court has adopted that standard in State v. 
~· 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259 (1972), wherein the 
test is stated as fol lows: 
The determination should be made on 
an objective standard: whether from the 
facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which fairly might be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in his position would be justified 
in believing that the suspect had 
committed the offense. 
495 P.2d 1259, 1260. See also State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 
129, 499 P.2d 276 (1972). In addition, this Court has stated 
often that the determination as to whether the arrest is based 
on probable cause is primarily for the trial court and will 
not be reversed on appeal unless c !early in error. State v. 
Eastmond, supra; State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). 
The trial court's determination that probable cause 
existed prior to the time of the arrest and its denial of 
appellant's motion to suppress should be affirmed (T. 86). 
POINT II 
THE SEIZURE OF THE ITEMS LOCATED IN THE 
BACK OF THE AUTOMOBILE WAS LAWFUL AND THE 
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SUCH 
SEIZED EVIDENCE. 
-17-
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At trial appellant made a motion to suppress 
evidence seized, claiming that the search of the automobile 
was not incident to a valid arrest and that the subsequent 
search and seizure was not based on exigent circumstances, 
The trial court correctly denied this motion, finding that 
there uas a valid arrest and thus probable cause existed ~ 
justify the search and seizure of the items located in the 
automobile (See Appendix A) (T. 83). 
Appellant now contends that seizure of the evidence 
at the police station without a warrant was in violation ~ 
his Fourth Amendment rights. Respondent submits that the 
seizure of the evidence occurred at the point that the 
automobile was immobilized and that it was justified under 
both the incident to a lawful arrest and automobile exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. 
In the present case, the initial "search" of the 
automobile occurred when Officer Levitre saw the items (laUr 
identified as stolen) in the back seat of the automobile. 
This discovery was not a search within the constitutional 
meaning of the term since it was within the plain view 
exception to the search and seizure requirement. State v. 
Echevarrieta, supra. 
The subsequent search and seizure of the evidence 
after it had been identified by the owner was based on 
probable cause and was effective from the time that the ~r 
-18-
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was placed in custody. Here, the seizure of the automobile 
a~ its contents occurred after both parties were placed under 
arrest. Thus the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest. 
The analysis justifying a search incident to lawful 
0.rrest is equally applicable to seizures which are incident to 
a lawful arrest. The propriety of a warrantless search 
incident to a lawful arrest was recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 
(1964). This Court has also recognized this exception to the 
general requirement of a warrant for conducting a search. 
Eastmond, supra; State v. White, Utah, 577 P.2d 552 (1978). 
The rationale of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42 
(1972) is that there is no difference between seizing the car 
at the scene and waiting for a search warrant and immediately 
searching the car at the scene. This applies equally to a 
case like this one where the actual removal of the evidence is 
done at the station but the legitimacy of the action is based 
on the probable cause which existed incident to the arrest. 
This Court has adopted the position that where a 
vehicle retains a reasonable degree of mobility and officers 
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband 
or evidence of a crime, the search may be made immediately 
without a warrant. state v. Limb, Utah, 581 P.2d 142 (1978); 
§.!..ate v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 (1972). 
-19-
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In the present case, the officers knew that the 
evidence was the fruit of crime as soon as it was identified 
by the owner, and from that point they were justified in 
seizing it to assure that it would be preserved. 
The seizure of evidence was also justified under 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The 
automobile exception was first recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132 
(1925}, where the Court stated: 
[T]he guaranty of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
Fourth Amendment has been construed, 
practically since the beginning of the 
government, as recognizing a necessary 
difference between a store, dwelling 
house, or other structure in respect of 
which a proper official warrant may 
readily be obtained and a search of a 
ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile 
for contraband goods, where it is not 
practicable to secure a warrant because 
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of 
the locality or jurisdiction in which the 
warrant must be sought • 
• • • The measure of legality of 
such a seizure is, therefore, that the 
seizing officer have reasonable or 
probable cause for believing that the 
automobile which he stops and seizes has 
contraband • • • therein • • 
267 u.s. 132, 153-156. At the point in time at which the 
seizure of the evidence was made in this case, the seizing 
officer knew that the evidence was stolen. 
-20-
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-
Appellant's reliance on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 u.s. 443 (1971) is inappropriate here because on the facts 
there the searching officers had no reason to believe the car 
might contain contraband or evidence of crime when the search 
a~ seizure occurred, whereas in this case the evidence had 
been postively identified as fruits of crime and the seizure 
~s thus justified either as incident to the lawful arrest or 
within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
Therefore, the denial of the mot ion to suppress was proper. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH VALUE. 
A. APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
WAS NOT VIOLATED BY FAILURE TO 
PRODUCE THE STOLEN TOOLS AT TRIAL. 
Respondent does not contest appellant's basic 
premise that the primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation is to allow the appellant the opportunity to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. State 
v, Manion, Utah, 57 p, 542 (1889). 
In the present case this right was not abridged. 
The appellant was allowed to, and did in fact, confront the 
state's witness who testified as to value (T. 104-114). The 
appellant claims that without the actual presence of the tools 
-21-
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he was unable to effectively test the credibility of the 
owner's estimate of value. This contention is not supported 
1. 
by application of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, 1 
The Sixth Amendment right carries with it the right l 
to have evidence presented only where that evidence is 
essential to prove an element of the crim~, as in State v. 
Havas, Nevada, 6 01 P. 2d 119 7 ( 19 79) • Where the destruction of 
the tools would not have precluded the state from presenting a 
prima facie case, the analysis of the Havas case does not 
apply. 
The failure to produce the evidence in this case 
was not prejudicial. The appellant produced his own expert 
witness, who testified as to the value of some of the items 
(T. 216). The trial court was, therefore, correct in 
determining that there was sufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could weigh the credibility of the owner's testimony as 
contrasted to that of the appellant's expert witness (T. 157), 
The appellant also concedes (Appellant's brief at 
17) that the failure to produce the evidence does not fall 
within the line of cases where the prosecution has 
deliberately failed to produce material evidence (e.g. ~ 
v. Stewart, Utah, 544 P.2d 477 (1975)). In this case there 
was no violation of any right essential to a fair trial. 
Furthermore, the appellant could easily have remedied any 
-22-
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~rceived inadequacy by issuing his own subpoena duces tecum 
tT. 154) to the owner of the stolen property, Robby Ashby. 
The failure to produce the tools may have been less 
than expedient, but their absence did not prejudice the 
appellant nor deny him his right to confront the witness 
against him (Robby Ashby). Therefore, the trial court was 
correct in denying appellant's motion to dismiss. 
B. THE STATE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE VALUE OF PROPERTY 
TAKEN BY APPELLANT EXCEEDED $1,000. 
This Court has consistently held that the test to 
determine the value of property stolen is the market value and 
that the acceptance of the values testified to is a question 
of fact which should be left to the jury. State v. Logan, 
Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977). In State v. Harris, Utah, 519 P.2d 
247 ( 1974), this Court found that: 
Value is something at which the jury may 
take a look. The owner of an article is 
competent to testify as to its value, and 
such testimony is admissible, but neither 
inviolate nor impervious to disbelief. 
519 P. 2d at 248. 
In the present case the trial court correctly 
denied appellant's motion to dismiss, rejecting his contention 
~at the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to 
-23-
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sustain the motion. The court determined that the owner of 
the stolen property may testify as to its value (~, 
supra) and that the jury was free to accept or reject his 
testimony (T. 89-120). 
... 
In order to find for the appellant on this point, 
this Court would have to determine that a~l of the testim~y 1 
as to value on the tools was improper. Since an owner may 
testify as to value, this contention is without merit. 
Furthermore, the testimony of appellant's expert witness (T, 
193-220) substantiated to a degree the testimony of the 
state's witness. However, the expert's testimony was not as 
complete as the owner's in that he did not testify as to the 
value of all items which were stolen (T. 216). The value of 
tools estimated by the owner at $1,300 (T. 94-100) was a 
question of fact which was properly left to the jury. 
From the decision of convict ion of second-degree 
theft, it is apparent that the jury chose to believe the 
testimony of the owner that the value of the stolen property 
exceeded $1,000. 
In State v. Whittenbeck, supra, this Court 
sustained the conviction where the jury had relied on the 
testimony of the owner of the laundromat which had been robbed 
to determine that the value was in excess of $250.00. 
Similarly, the jury's reliance on the owner's testimony of 
value should be upheld in this case. 
-24-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, it is apparent that 
the conviction of the appellant for second-degree theft was 
proper and that appellant's Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights 
were not violated. The conviction and sentence should 
therefore be affirmed. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~7JJ~~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Peter 
Stirba, Attorney for Appellant, McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & 
CONDIE, 500 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84133, 
this 29th day of December, 
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:11 THE COURT: In this case based on the·, testimony 
jl9 and the reasonable inferences from it, it involves many 
120 facets of the law. I don't know whether I' 11 cover them all 
ll or not. But in the first place you have a subjective test 
122 as to probable cause for both arrest and seizure, search and 
ll seizure. In this case the hour is of some import. Here you 
i 14 , ave a parking area in a store complex with no thoroughfare 
lS here through. 
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So, you have the hour. I think the testimony 
2 that the stores during the weekdays closed was at 6:00 
3 o'clock, and service stations and other things in that area, 
4 
or whatever it closed 10:00. was, at So, it is a private 
5 parking area. And-any one of the public is an invitee for 
6 
the purposes of going there to the stores and the businesses 
7 
there in that area. That's one factor. 
8 Another factor is that the stores did not have 
9 any security at that time, and due to the number of break-ins 
lO two days before a request had gone out for additional obser-
11 vations of the area by the police department, and that was 
l2 reiterated on each shift~ - You have that factor. There's no 
13 evidence of any other vehicles in that area either on the 
14 roadway or in the· parking area· or-- in the store area. 
15 You've-got a police car that's clearly 
16 marked coming down the street, and a car abruptly turning in. 
17 
18 
So, at that point you've got police officer that knows of 
lots of break-ins in that area at the time you've got an 
19 abrupt turning. You've got the public have no right in that 
20 area as per se at that time. So, it's reasonable for a 
21 police officer to determine why a vehicle would be in that 
22 area at that particular time. 
23 You've got him after he sees the. vehicle go 
24 in, back up so he can observe. He sees it turn there 
25 between the buildings, backs up so he can see whether it 
~,- . 7l~1,, 
81 
I I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
exits. Gives sufficient time for it to come through. It 
doesn't come through. So, there is an assumption there that 
the vehicle is still there. So, he goes in to make inquiry. 
The car is there with the hood up. And to make inquiry as 
to why they were there.· 
i 6 According to one police officer I think thi.s 
defendant did not have any identification as such. The 
other party did have that. They were taken to respective 
' 
vehicles for further inquiry. To separate them. Then after 
10 that because of the discrepancies in the explanations the 
11 other person was--the other defendant was confronted. And 
11 an arrest still wasn't made at that time. 
13 But when this defendant testifies he was 
14 immediately placed under arrest for receiving or being in 
l5 possession of stolen property, it is not a logical inference. 
16 I can't believe him. Because ·they did go down and observe 
17 the vehicle that was described by the other defendant, which 
18 indicated a break-in. The owner of that property was taken 
19 back to the scene, and the property, the stolen property, 
20 the alleged stolen property in the back was in clearview.' 
21 Even at the time that the officers first went up there it 
11 was in clear view. But it wasn ··t until they were informed 
23 by the owner that that ·was stolen property that an arrest was 
24 made. 
25 
So, the court w~uld find probable cause both 
r 82 
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in--they did not make arrest. They further investigated, 
2 which would be logical under the circumstances. And then 
3 after it was determined that the property had been stolen, 
4 and identified as stolen property, without any search. It 
5 was in plain view. It was at that time that they made the 
6 arrest. And it would be at that time that the defendants 
7 are not entitled to the possession of that property. 
8 So, at that point the Court would find that it 
9 was a valid arrest,. that there was reasonable. and probable 
10 ·cause to further investigate the case, to make a determina-
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
tion as to the suspicious circumstances that the defendant 
was found in, and tha~ upon_ verification the_ arrests were 
validly made. And at that time there would be a probable 
cause for search and seizure. 
Now, most of the cases on automobile--it's 
true that based on probable cause and absent exigent circum-
stances that a search warrant should be obtained beforehand. 
But, you see, most of those cases, if you follow them 
through, you see, the property, which is subject matter of 
20 the crime, is discovered by reason of the search. And a 
21 great nwr.ber of cases justifr search without warrant on the 
22 basis that products can be easily removed from a vehicle, 
23 disposed of, or moved to another locale. But most of those 
24 cases, that is where you make the search and then discover 
25 the fruits of the crime. 
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In this case the fruits of the crime are 
apparent from the first observation. But at that time they 
3 were not aware that they were fruits of a crime. 
4 
So, it's not something that they discover 
-incident to the arrest or incident to the seizure. So, in 
this case it is preliminary investigation determination that 
the crime had actually been committed, the fruits of the 
crime in clear view had never been seized prior to the 
arrest. And after the arrest there was nothing gained, 
10 no knowledge, anything else gained by incident of the seizure 
11 of the goods. · 
12 So, the only question is here that remains, 
13 as I view it, is after they take possession of the vehicle, 
14 
and take it to the police station, and remove--at the time 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
I 22 
they got to the police station remove the fruits of the 
crime from the car itself. And I'm willing to go with the 
United States Supreme Court on that. 
The facts are not too important, but in Fran.k 
Chambers vs. James F. Maroney, 26 Law Edition 2d 419, and 
27 Law Edition 2d 94, if I remember right, that was a--· 
there's only one point in this that's of material import to 
this case. It involves three points that went up to the 
! ll 
United States Supreme court on certiorari, and the majority 
1ll 
1
1 
opinion, which was Justice White, was supported by s~ven 
21 
rerr.bers of the court. The pertinent point here H; the search 
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,I,, <"' p 
the car 
of the car did not violate the petitioner's Constitutional 
in orde They had probable cause for stopping and then 
2 
rights. 
3 
search. And they addressed themselves specifically to when I based c 
4 
5 
was seized and the contents thereof. However, it. :,t crime 
was taken to the police station before th.e fruits of the ',~ searcb 
the car 
6 \, 
crime were removed from the car. That's the pertinent point \' 
7 
in this .case that the· Court relies on. And in that they '\t diffe 
8 
held it's not unreasonable for police officers to take an ~ start 
9 
automopile to a police station before making a warrantless ~ 
· 10 search of the automobile. But this isn't a search. That's 
11 another distinguishing factor in this. It is not a search 
. -
12 in that sense. As I've indicated before. It's a seizure. 
13 And it's a seizure of contraband goods. Your motion to 
14 
suppress is denied. 
15 Here's your cases back, both of you. The 
Hi distinguishing part, I believe it's our California case. 
17 
Where's that? Yeah. This is your case here. The distin-
18 
guishing parts, your fact situation are not the same in your 
19 California case. You see, it wasn't a question of your 
20 first observation of criminal behavior. I would agree with 
21 you if the Court found that the arrest was made on that 
22 basis. I would certainly agree with you. Under your 
23 California case. But in this case certainly inquiry as to 
24 why they were in that area would be appropriate, which was 
25 not the case in your California case. He was fo_und asleep 
p.m. 
the 
not 
I 
• t1 
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11 
in the parking area. An arrest was made and they searched 
the car and got electronic equipment from the car. 
In this case certainly inquiry was a necessity 
' in order to determine why they would be in that area. And 
en I based on that inquiry they further made inquiry as to the 
'I crime itself. Nothing was discovered by reason of that 
. 11 
1~ search. 
I 
nt :' But the fact situation this Court feels is 
I 
' different than the one in your California case. We' 11 
~ start trial at 2: 00 o'clock. 
' . (Thereupon, Court was held in recess at 12:45 
I 
1 
p.m. and reconvened at 2: 00 o'clock p.rn. in the afternoon of 
the same day.) 
THE COURT: Is there still one juror who's 
not here'? Who is i t7 
THE CLERK: Douros. 
THE COURT: Pull his card, then. I'll want 
to speak to him as to why he isn't here. 
Ordinarily we start a jury trial at 10:00 
o'clock and go until 12:00, and then recess until 2:00 and 
go until 5:00. You were called for 11:00 o'clock this 
morning because of some matters of law that had to be taken 
up prior to the start of this trial. And it took a little 
bit longer than we anticipated.. But we had you stay around 
because, hopefully, we could have selected the·:jury,. and 
I 
' I 
I 
,, 
'i 
i 
.1 
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